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T he theory presented suggests that underwriters areboth advisors and independent agents in theissuer’s attempt to send “signals” of quality to
investors by making pre-IPO organizational changes.These
pre-IPO gambits are intended to increase IPO proceeds, and
preemptively address potential investor concerns that
would deter them from subscribing. These organizational
changes initially can financially benefit founders, early
investors and underwriters. But they can also have a long-
term impact that some issuers, especially founders, would
prefer to avoid. Utilizing signaling and resource-based
power, we find that underwriter power is significantly asso-
ciated with making pre-IPO gambits and lower levels of
underpricing.
Keywords: initial public offerings, resource-based power, sig-
naling, organizational theory, underpricing
Over the past thirty years and especially in the last ten, there
has been an enormous amount of research on the signals of
quality that differentiate and add value to new issues in the
eyes of investors. One reason for this interest was the high
levels of new issue underpricing that occurred in the 1990s,
when average levels reached as high as 65% of offer price
(Loughran & Ritter, 2004). In the late 1990s, strategy and
entrepreneurship researchers turned their attention to initial
public offerings (IPOs) and focused on identifying quality sig-
nals that increase investor perceptions of value and help
reduce levels of underpricing (Beatty, 1989; Beatty & Ritter,
1986; Certo, 2003; Chemmanur & Paeglis, 2005; Grinblatt &
Hwang, 1989; Gulati & Higgins, 2003).This attention is more
than justified in the case of entrepreneurship. One cannot
forget that the entrepreneurial process is not limited to the
discovery of an innovation but the creation of value from the
innovation,which involves the ability to gather the resources
to create a viable business organization and navigate the envi-
ronment to exploit the innovation‘s value.Among the many
challenges is the ability to raise funds to support the growth
of the organization, and that need, in many cases, leads to an
IPO.Also for many entrepreneurs, the IPO is the first chance
to monetize some of the sweat equity that has been accruing
during the early stages of the firm.
Among the signal theory research streams, some have sug-
gested that investors assign value to the backgrounds, experi-
ences, and prestigious ties of an issuing firm’s top manage-
ment team (TMT), board of directors, and affiliates (Certo,
2003; Chen, Pollock, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2005; Filatotchev
& Bishop, 2002; Gulati & Higgins, 2003). Identifying accurate
signals of quality is particularly interesting to investors and
academics because of the high volume of subsequent and
dramatic failures that occurred in the late 1990s. Some of
these signals are the result of industry choice, long-term strat-
egy,and founding conditions that evolve slowly or are central
to a firm’s business model, while other signals can be manip-
ulated prior to a firm’s IPO in order “dress up”for a more suc-
cessful sale to the public. Some firms choose to add presti-
gious executives, directors, and affiliates just before going
public to add legitimacy and to address potential investor
concerns preemptively. This process is particularly stressful
for the entrepreneur, who has to relinquish part of the con-
trol and autonomy to the new management, but also stresses
the existing organizations.These changes can be bittersweet;
the cost of these new individuals is high, and top manage-
ment changes can cause long-term disruption and shift in cul-
ture if these changes include replacing the original founding
entrepreneurs or long-tenured employees. Therefore many
issuers would be reluctant to bring in new people.
Underwriters with their superior power, however, may chal-
lenge the issuer to make these changes regardless of cost or
firm disruption, since they bear neither expense and these
changes make the shares easier to sell (see Figure 1).
Past theories have looked at signals in a static state or a sin-
gle point in time, and ignore movement occurring during the
period leading up to the offer date. These theories identify
the issuers as the signaling actor, whereas this study moves
the underwriter into the forefront of pre-IPO signaling.
Previous research has tested for the moderating effect of
underwriter prestige, but has not looked at differences in rel-
ative power on a deal-by-deal basis.This study will empirical-
ly test the impact of relative bargaining power on issuers’pre-
IPO strategies. Finally, the theory and methods used in this
article will take a resources-based approach to measure each
actor’s bargaining strength compared to the other, and use
that difference to predict outcomes at the deal level.
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Background
The market for IPOs is characterized by product uncertainty,
asymmetric information, and adverse selection. In these mar-
kets, it is critical for sellers to signal a high-quality firm image;
otherwise,buyers cannot differentiate between their product
and lower quality vendors.Akerlof (1970) referred to this as
a “lemons problem” where in the absence of quality signals,
buyers are only willing to pay the lowest possible price.
Spence (1973) defined signals as “observable characteristics
[that convey information] attached to the individual [in this
case firm] that are subject to manipulation by him” (p. 357).
We apply these concepts and definitions in the context of
new issues; the signaler [firm] attempts to convey favorable
information to affect the [receiver’s] subjective assessment
about the quality of the firm’s equity. Spence (1973) separat-
ed attributes into two categories, indices and signals.
Investors seek information about the issuer, which man-
agers, along with their underwriter, provide in the form of a
prospectus and to some a “road show.” The preliminary
prospectus meets the criteria of a signal in that it is both
observable and known in advance of the investment decision
(Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2005; Ross, 1977), and contains a
plethora of indices and signals. Indices that are unalterable
attributes include industry (Bain, 1968; Porter, 1980), geo-
graphic location(Porter, 1990), firm age, and size (Kim &
Ritter, 1999; Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986). Each of these
attributes has been empirically found to add firm value or
enhance chances for survival. Financial data, prestigious
executives, and alliances can be manipulated over time by
the firm and as such we categorize them differently as “sig-
nals.”The resources used by the applicant to create this sig-
nal Spence terms “signaling costs.”
Signals of quality come in many different forms.Academics
who favored the knowledge-based view have focused on
intellectual properties, R&D spending, and scientific capabil-
ities (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs,
1998; Higgins & Gulati, 2006), while others have looked at
social ties and legitimacy (Higgins & Gulati, 2003).A firm that
is taken public by a prestigious underwriter assumes the
gloss of that underwriter’s industry reputation and corporate
brand image (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Benveniste & Spindt,
1989; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Cooney, Singh, Carter, & Dark,
2001). Simunic and Stein (1987), Beatty (1989), and Balvers
et. al. (1988) found that IPO market participants pay a premi-
um for auditor credibility.
The prestigious ties of top executives and board members
allow the firm access to a broader and richer set of resources
(Certo, 2003; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Chemmanur &
Paeglis, 2005; Jackson & Hambrick, 2002; Podolny, 1993) and
can also be a signal to investors. Further, firms become a
reflection of their top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) suggested that TMTs that
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exhibit high quality and noteworthy reputations can “convey
the intrinsic value of their firm more credibly to outsiders”
and provide a certification function (p.332).
Signaling Theory
An important feature of Spence’s 1973 signaling model is its
dynamic and iterative nature as signals of applicant quality
are sent to employers and wage schedules as a function of
the signals and indices are sent back potential applicants.The
same can be said for new issuing firms and the prospectus
signals. Investors send signals in the form of equity orders
and concerns during the book-building process and through
ultimate purchase. Further, investors can communicate addi-
tional valuation signals indirectly through the underwriters
during the roadshows. These signals can include intent to
buy, concerns of operating history, management experience,
industry position, and investment risk. Underwriters have
stored signals from these investors’ previous deals and pur-
chase experience. As a consequence, the underwriter
becomes a repository of both signals of quality and signals
of concern, which they translate into current investor’s pref-
erences and pricing schedules and is graphically shown in
Figure 2.
Thus, an important benefit of hiring an active underwriter
with a good track record is its ability to counsel issuing firms
on the best way to market themselves to investors.
Underwriters inform issuers of investors’ preferences during
the preparation and registration periods of the pre-IPO
process, completing the signaling cycle. Underwriters typi-
cally suggest changes the firm can implement to improve
both the array and quality of their signals to improve
investors’ likely reaction.
It is interesting to note that underwriters are depicted in
Figure 2 as an independent third party in the iterative
process and not simply as part of the issuer’s team.Treating
the underwriter as independent is an extension of Spence’s
dyad and a departure from the way strategy and finance
researchers have applied signaling theory to the IPO context.
Issuers and underwriters work together to subscribe the
offering fully but they also have divergent motives as well.
Extant theory has not characterized the underwriter as an
additional, independent actor in the signaling loop. However,
underwriters take title to the equity in “firm offer” IPOs—the
most common type (Ellis, Michaely, & O'Hara, 2001). They
then sell the equity to their own customers whom they have
an ongoing relationship. Therefore, underwriters have an
independent financial self-interest to maximize, as well as
their own reputation to protect and may not share congruent
objectives with the issuer. For example, underwriters may
not communicate all of the signals they receive from
investors during the book-building process, choosing instead
to keep a portion of that information private (Biais,Bossaerts,
& Rochet, 2002). Signals regarding the actual demand, and
the price investors are willing to pay, can be screened by
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underwriters wanting to set a lower offer to increase profit
for their investing clients and lower their risk (Houston,
James, & Karceski, 2006; Loughran & Ritter, 2004).
Long-Term Signals vs. Short-Term Gambits
While most industry and performance characteristics cannot
be changed close to the IPO, some IPO signals can be modi-
fied during the preparation stages. Examples include earn-
ings (Teoh,Welch, & Wong, 1998), use of proceeds (Busaba,
Benveniste, & Guo, 2001), and the auditor of record (Balvers
et al., 1988; Carpenter & Strawser, 1971). However, previous
research has not differentiated human capital signals based
on the length of time at the firm so executives who are
brought in a few months before the IPO are not considered
part of a short-term actively signaling strategy. For that rea-
son, short-term, pre-IPO firm changes with the intent to
increase the value of the firm,we term “gambits.”For both the
investor and the academic, it is important to differentiate
organically-derived long-term signals of firm quality from
short-term, pre-IPO gambits aimed at increasing IPO pro-
ceeds, since these strategies can have different short-term
and long-term consequences (see Table 1).
Strategies aimed at increased short-term proceeds may
have negative long-term financial or organizational impact.
Another reason to distinguish organizational changes close to
the time of the IPO is to determine who is actually doing the
signaling. Is it the issuer attempting to increase demand and
equity value? Or, is it the underwriter attempting to maxi-
mize its profit and reduce risk while having the issuer bear
the signaling costs?
Making changes to members of the TMT can create short-
term disruption and trigger longer-term turbulence. Hannan,
Polos,and Carroll (2003) term this effect “cascading organiza-
tional change.”This process begins with a change in an orga-
nization’s formal architecture and prompts other changes in
the organization,generating a cascade of changes that initiate
periods of reorganization. Burton, Helliar, and Power (2004)
questioned executives in the top management on change
prior to their flotation. Forty-six percent of respondents
observed that after the decision to go public was made, there
was a change in top management personnel prior to the
flotation. After the flotation, 44 percent of those who
changed observed additional changes in top management.
The organizational changes can effect culture, corporate mis-
sion, personnel policies, internal processes, and alter employ-
ee’s implicit contracts, bases of power and fit with the organ-
ization resulting in turnover (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell,
1991). In summary, pre-IPO organizational changes can have
positive or negative impact on the issuing firm.We argue that
the issuing firm’s managers would resist making these
changes and incurring these additional costs unless the firm
encountered strong underwriter influence, and it lacked the
requisite bargaining power to resist.
Relative Bargaining Power and Hypotheses
Instead of thinking of underwriters as commissioned sales
agents, they can be viewed as a larger retailer who profits on
every unit sold. The parties negotiate on the price paid for
the product and the resulting margin with each side wanting
to maximize its position. This framework is conceptually
grounded in bargaining power and dependence perspective
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In the IPO context, the issuer
offers its equity for sale. If it is a strong company, its resources
will be a well-known brand name. The underwriter has its
own resources such as co-managers, a strong book of institu-
tional and retail investors, and most importantly stock ana-
lysts who can help promote the stock in the aftermarket. A
firm that has the option to contribute or withhold an impor-
tant resource or input can use that option as bargaining lever-
age (Pfeffer,1981).For example, the underwriter could refuse
to continue the IPO if the firm chooses not to make organi-
zational changes or does not accept the offer price.
During the IPO process, issuers are required by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to furnish a
detailed description of the firm’s operations, and audited
financial statements (Beatty, 1989). The prestigious auditor
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Table 1. A Topology of IPO Signals
Issuer Attributes Description
Indices Age, size, industry, geography, etc. Observable and unalterable.
Signals of quality (issuers) Firm performance, IP portfolio, profits, debt-level,
product offerings, long-term employees and affili-
ates, etc.
Intrinsic and gained through organic growth or the
execution of long-term strategy.
Signals of concern (investors) Short operating history, insufficient revenue/profit,
inexperienced management, uncertain of
present/future technology pipeline.
Concerns voiced or inferred by investors during
book-building process, or from past deals that nega-
tively affect demand for equity offering
Gambits Choice of underwriter, auditor, CEO, CFO, COO,
chairman, directors, etc.
Alterable through execution of short-term IPO
strategy to project quality image and allay
investor’s concerns
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selection is important to address investors’ agency-related
concerns about the firm’s control system (Simunic & Stein,
1987), add legitimacy and transfer status (Stuart, Hoang, &
Hybles, 1999), address the ex ante uncertainty, and signal the
quality of private information about the firm’s future
prospects to investors who fear a “lemons problem.” Support
for this idea is provided in Carpenter and Strawser’s (1971)
review, which found that underwriters can influence an
issuer to switch from their smaller or regional auditor to a
large, nationally recognized firm.The foundation of bargain-
ing power is evident in hypothesis 1.
H1: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power are
more likely to change auditors. 
As the firm is a reflection of the top managers (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984), the CEO will attract the most scrutiny from
investors.Young entrepreneurial firms with a short operating
history, or an inexperienced management team, generate
fears about the CEO’s ability to successfully transition from a
private to a public firm (Flamholtz, 1986), and meet future
prospectus expectations. Public firms experience more gov-
ernmental requirements, shareholder scrutiny, and interfer-
ence from special interest groups, in addition to creating and
implementing their strategic plan.The CEO’s job has a high
level of complexity, ambiguity, and information overload
(Mintzberg, 1973). Even though inexperienced managers can
be helped by veteran directors, investors will be concerned
if the requisite skills do not reside in the top executive.
Therefore, in situations of young inexperienced founders and
or managers whose firm is now moving to a new level of
expectation, underwriters will try to replace the CEO with a
manager that has recognized legitimacy in the role and will
address investor concerns. However, convincing a CEO to
step aside is a difficult task especially if the CEO is
entrenched or has substantial ownership. In those cases,
underwriters can move to bolster the signals to investors by
bringing in an experienced manager to be the chief operat-
ing officer (COO).Potential investors will also signal concern
if the issuer’s chief financial officer (CFO) lacks public corpo-
ration experience.
During the registration process, issuers use their under-
writer to help prepare the necessary disclosures to the SEC.
However,after the public offering the responsibility for finan-
cial disclosure becomes the obligation of its corporate finan-
cial officers. On-going shareholder communication can be
difficult for financial officers with limited, pre-IPO experi-
ence yet managing stockholders expectations and resultant
stock prices is a central CFO responsibility (Zhang &
Margarethe, 2009; Zorn, 2004). New public enterprises
require stable, reliable earnings, which may require income
smoothing,expense accruals for the year ahead, and earnings
estimates for portfolio managers (Teoh et al., 1998). Private
companies usually have more leeway to have profits in peaks
and valleys, whereas public firms must have a more reliable
profitability consistent with management’s forecasts. Small,
private companies with home-grown accountants and book-
keepers lack this experience. The CFO also has a primary
responsibility to shareholders to disclose accurate financial
results. Shareholder and stock analysts will be assessing the
reliability of the internal financial disclosures of the issuer.
The higher the prestige of the financial officer’s background
the more confident investors will feel about the firm’s
prospective financial reporting. Different from the auditor
who certifies past performance and current inventories, the
CFO certifies future cash flows and cash needs.The struggle
between current management and the underwriter’s wishes
is evident in the next three hypotheses.
H2a: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power are
more likely to change CEOs.
H2b: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power
are more likely to add a COO.
H2c: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power are
more likely to change CFOs. 
H2d: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power
are more likely to change the chairman of the board.
Agency theorists have long been concerned about the con-
flict of interest between shareholders and management
(Fama & Jensen, 1983).This concern is more acute in young
firms that may not have a quality signaling reputation.
Neubaum, Mitchell, and Schminke (2004) found a positive
relationship between firm age and an ethical climate focused
on self-interest and company profit. They suggested that
young firms “faced with the liability of newness, scarcity of
resources, and concerns for survival might be pressured to
make choices that run counter to the tenets of more devel-
oped ethical and moral reasoning” (p. 336). IPO firms tend to
be young, with an average age of seven years (Ritter, 1991).
Directors can also have a positive effect on young TMTs and
bring a wealth of experience, social capital, and legitimacy to
firms short on operating history or management experience.
Issuers and underwriters can signal equity quality to
investors through the prestige of its board members, which
enhances the firm’s social networks and access to critical
resources (Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
They are also perceived as valuable mentors to young man-
agers (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Johnson, Ellstrand, &
Daily, 1996). Experienced investors will signal concerns
about potential deficiencies in a limited board of directors.
Investor’s concerns might be placated with the addition of
directors with operating experience, or prestigious social
networks and backgrounds in financial control.Underwriters
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will then press issuers to add directors with these qualities.
The intersection between these actors’ preferences and the
interplay of the relative bargaining power of the issuer and
underwriter are evident in the next hypothesis.
H3: Issuers with lower relative bargaining power are
more likely to add new directors.
For the issuer,one financial purpose of making these changes
prior to going public is to reduce the level of underpricing.
Many studies have shown a negative relationship between
TMT prestige and underpricing (Certo, 2003; Chen et al.,
2005; Cohen & Dean, 2005). Hiring new top managers with
an eminent IPO can be costly as these individuals will be
looking to be compensated in both salary and equity. Pre-IPO
equity will be available at a discount and worth more at this
point.So the benefits in additional proceeds should outweigh
the cost in salary and in benefits.Otherwise it would be more
sensible to wait until after the IPO and pay with shares that
are worth more and options with a higher strike price.
Therefore, it would follow that
H4a: Issuers that add new top executives in the six
months prior to their IPO will experience lower lev-
els of underpricing.
H4b: Issuers that add new directors in the six months




The sample was limited to firms that had their initial public
offering between May 1991 and June 1998 and were drawn
from the SDC New Issues Database. All the firms from eight
individual SIC codes were included, producing a total of 338
firms. The industries of Computer and Telecommunication
Hardware, Men’s and Women’s Apparel, Pharmaceuticals, and
Computer Software and Services provide the population of
firms used for this study.These industries represent both high-
growth and mature industries, manufacturing and service, as
well as high-technology and research-intensive firms. Unit
offerings, and issues with offering prices below $5 were
dropped,consistent with Loughram and Ritter (2004).To avoid
confusion between original hires and new hires, I dropped
firms less than two years old. Data for this sample was drawn
from SDC and COMPUSTAT. Data on management, tenure, and
equity ownership were obtained from S-1’s and final prospec-
tuses filed with the SEC. Information on firm founding dates,
for issuers that went public after 1996,was updated using data
provided by Alexander Ljungqvist, New York University. Data
collection techniques are detailed in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm
(2003). Additionally, underwriter data were drawn from the
Securities Industry Yearbook. IPOs with missing data from
either the issuer or underwriter were dropped to yield the
final sample of 224 issuing firms. The 66 lead underwriters
associated with these IPOs had a combined market share of
92.6% of the total IPO industry in the United States.
Measures
Dependent Variables. There are 7 different dependent vari-
ables for the hypotheses being tested. Five dummy variables
represent a single change in NewAuditor, NewCEO6,
NewCOO6, NewCFO6, and New Chair6, in the six months
preceding the public offering. One additional dummy, Top
Change6, represents a single change in any of the four TMT
positions.An executive is considered new if his or her tenure
in that position is less than six months.There are two contin-
uous dependent variables, one for NewDirector, which is the
number of new directors with less than six months tenure,
and underpricing, which can be obtained by combining the
offer price taken the final prospectus filed with the SEC, and
the first day closing price from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) utilizing the calculations: UP = P1 -
P0)/P0 (Certo et al., 2001; Pollock & Rindova, 2003).
Independent Variable. The measure for underwriter
power was a factor score created using factor analysis, a sta-
tistical technique abundant in social science literature and
employed to generate indexes used in regression analysis
(Chatterjee, Jamieson, & Wiseman, 1999). The items in this
factor are (1) number of institutional sales representatives,
(2) number of offices, (3) total number of Institutional
Investor (II) all-star analysts, (4) number of II all-star analysts
covering the industries of the issuer, (5) total assets of the
underwriters parent, (6) total departments of parent, and (7)
total employees of parent.The final factor had an eigenvalue
of 4.84, explained 69.1% of the variance, and had a Cronbach
alpha of 0.883.
The measure for Issuer power is also a factor score creat-
ed using factor analysis.The items in this factor are: (1) assets,
(2) liabilities, (3) expected market capitalization,and (4) offer
size. The factor analysis produced an eigenvalue 3.61,
explained 31.2% of the variance, and had a Cronbach alpha
of 0.807.
The measure of relative power is the ratio between issuer
power and underwriter power. Since the measures of power
are factor scores, they vary from a negative score to a positive
score with a mean of zero. In order to properly reflect rela-
tive power, it was necessary to make both component scores
positive by adding a constant, such that the minimum score
is 1.0. In determining the impact of such a relative score in
regression analysis, it is necessary to enter the two compo-
nent scores in an initial model, and then add the relative
score to determine whether relative power of the two parties
explains further variance.
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Control Variables. Several issuer and underwriter meas-
ures used in prior studies were included as controls to
enhance the confidence that significant findings here would
be adding to the base of knowledge in this area. Daily et al.
(2003) performed a meta-analysis on variables previously
associated with IPO underpricing in at least three prior stud-
ies (effect size 241, n=161,013). Their work was used as a
starting point in identifying control variables. Their meta-
analysis included: (1) retained equity (percent of officers and
director shares), (2) underwriter prestige (using Carter and
Manaster measure updated by Loughram and Ritter (2004),
(3) auditor reputation (1 if a Big 5 firm,else 0), (4) number of
risk factors, (5) firm size, (6) firm age, (7) number of uses, (8)
venture capital equity (1 or 0), (9) offer price, and (10) IPO
gross proceeds. The variable number of uses was dropped
here because it was not significant in their meta-analysis.
Most of the rationale for the variables included here has been
discussed earlier, however, for more information see Daily,
Certo, Dalton, and Roengpitya (2003). In addition, I include
dummy variables representing the four industry groups, and
a year variable to capture time-fixed effects.
Results
Descriptive statistics and inter-item correlations for the vari-
ables in the study can be found in Table 2.The results of this
study show that 224 issuers chose to make 465 new top man-
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Table 2. Logistic Regressions 
New Auditor New CEO New COO New CFO New Chairman
Variable Control Model 1 Control Model 2a Control Model 2b Control Model 2c Control Model 2d
Constant -2.614**  -1.854     -0.802     0.151     3.986     -3.895     -1.693     -2.609     -10.158** -10.084**
(1.201) (2.742) (1.769) (4.308) (2.415) (6.643) (1.156) (2.333) (1.27) (2.803)
Tele/Comp -0.243     -0.259     -1.684* -1.685* -0.992     -0.545     -0.065     0.039     0.697     0.699     
(0.491) (0.498) (1.14) (1.132) (1.081) (1.117) (0.393) (0.406) (0.597) (0.591)
Apparel 1.27**  1.283**  2.169     2.608     -3.047** -2.925* -0.589     -0.378     1.257* 1.273*
(0.607) (0.633) (0.894) (1.022) (1.228) (1.515) (0.616) (0.647) (0.734) (0.745)
Pharmaceuticals -1.393**  -1.361**  -1.139     -1.158     -2.321** -2.260* -0.519     -0.545     -0.327     -0.403     
(0.639) (0.647) (0.707) (0.72) (1.095) (1.334) (0.412) (0.43) (0.649) (0.661)
Age of Firm -0.02     -0.023     -0.4** -0.4** -0.596** -0.594** -0.01     -0.002     -0.224* -0.226*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.056) (0.06) (0.024) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Year -0.037     -0.055     -0.432     -0.453     -0.547     -0.807     0.019     0.046     -0.216     -0.235     
(0.122) (0.124) (0.167) (0.18) (0.275) (0.352) (0.098) (0.103) (0.133) (0.138)
Pct. Insider Equity 0.011     0.012     -0.016     -0.017     -0.011     -0.012     0.001     0.000 1.380** 1.365**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Risk Factors 0.01     0.012     -0.02* -0.02* 0.045     0.085     -0.005     -0.001     -0.24*** -0.24***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.052) (0.055) (0.089) (0.096) (0.031) (0.033) (0.039) (0.04)
Venture Backed -0.09     -0.074     0.008     0.198     -0.434     -0.67     0.125     0.212     0.072** 0.072**
(0.414) (0.419) (0.575) (0.607) (0.722) (0.773) (0.331) (0.344) (0.469) (0.478)
Auditor Prestige 0.667     0.705     2.057     2.353     -0.546     -0.291     1.127     1.298     -0.339     -0.278     
(0.758) (0.774) (1.293) (1.362) (1.186) (1.239) (0.803) (0.828) (0.722) (0.744)
Offer Price 0.018     -0.002     -0.08     0.019     -0.153     0.059     -0.001     0.091     0.103     0.138     
(0.045) (0.063) (0.073) (0.09) (0.095) (0.152) (0.036) (0.052) (0.047) (0.07)
Underwriter Power -0.28 -0.788     0.499     -0.085     -0.531     
(0.615) (0.906) (1.700) (0.465) (0.61)
Issuer Power 0.394     0.259     -2.408     -0.518     0.325     
(0.731) (1.233) (2.204) (0.606) (0.74)
Issuer Power Ratio -0.446     -2.881     5.463     -0.773     -1.737     
(2.203) (3.559) (6.212) (1.785) (2.202)
-2 Log likelihood 184.446 183.429 113.107 108.111 58.941 52.853 269.51 258.969 160.409 158.89
PseudoRsq 0.313 0.025 0.014 0.001 0.218
* p ! .10; ** p ! .05; *** p ! .01
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agement, and board hires in the six months leading up to
their IPO.The average number of days in registration for the
sample was 98 days and many firms work with their under-
writers preparing documents before the registration period
begins.There were 36 firms that switched auditors prior to
the IPO.The average age of the issuers since founding was 12
years, with the median at 7 years. This suggests that firms
were not strictly backfilling normal attrition. Most common
were new board members and CFOs.This could be to give
investors the perception that there is sufficient supervision
of management (Certo et al.,2001) and adequate oversight to
the preparation of the financial disclosures to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry (Cohen & Dean, 2005). One in 10 issuers
hired a new CEO, and 1 in 3.5 brought in a CFO. Of all the
new hires, the CEO position in particular meant that some-
one else was replaced. Of the 224 companies in the sample,
74 made new hires.The remaining 150 companies made an
average of more than 3 top management new hires prior to
going public.
Logistic regression analysis was used to test Hypotheses 1
to 2d. Each of the dependent variables was created and
coded 1 if there was a change in that position in the six
months prior to the offer date,otherwise 0.Since relative bar-
gaining power is theorized to help issuers resist influence to
make organizational changes, the hypothesized coefficient
should be negative. Multicolinearity did not pose a problem,
as the variance inflation factors for the full regression model
with 224 observations ranged from 1.06 to 1.86 (Chatterjee,
Hadi, & Price, 2000).The results for change in auditor, CEO,
and chairman show no significant association with relative
bargaining power, and in fact, underwriter prestige does not
significantly add to the explanation of variance (see Table 3).
Therefore, there is no support for Hypotheses 1, 2a, 2c, or 2d.
In all but one, new COO, the coefficient for relative resource
power is negative in the theoretical direction, however they
were not significant.As a group, the addition of explanatory
variables reduced the -2 Log likelihood a significant amount;
however, no single variable was significant on its own.
Because the Issuer Power Ratio is a linear combination of the
other two power measures, the VIF scores rose above 14 for
those variables in the last step, suggesting high multicollinear-
ity. Ultimately, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported.
Hierarchical multiple regressions were used to test
Hypotheses 3 and 4.Consistent with the results found for the
TMT positions, the coefficients for issuer and underwriter
power are not significant or in the theoretical direction.
Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Hypothesis 4 was tested two
ways: with the independent variable as dummy representing
change in any of the 4 top management positions, and as a
continuous variable representing the sum of changes in the
top positions.The coefficient for bank prestige is positive and
significant, which is consistent with previous studies of the
underpricing in the 1990s.The coefficient for issuer power is
negative and significant, consistent with results from the first
two chapters.The issuer power ratio continues to be not sig-
nificant.When top management change is added, both coeffi-
cients are negative and significant, suggesting that the addi-
tion of one or more new top management executives will
reduce underpricing in a cumulative fashion. Therefore
Hypotheses 4a and 4b find strong support.The coefficient for
NewDirector <6 is negative in the theoretical direction but
not significant. Hypothesis 4c then is not supported.
Discussion 
Past studies of signaling theory have examined signals in a
static state.This research focuses on a subset of signals that
are part of an active selling strategy.Further,new measures of
power were incorporated to test whether the active signal-
ing is a strategy of the issuer or the underwriter. There are
two aspects of the signaling activity tested here: (1), whether
the signals are achieving the desired results, namely higher
IPO proceeds; and (2) whether the signals are coming from
the issuer or the underwriter. On the first point, it is clear
from the results that short-term gambits to improve the qual-
ity of the TMT have a significant positive effect on IPO pro-
ceeds.The average issue size in this study is $46.3 million and
the average level of underpricing is 18.8%. According to
Model 4a and 4b, the reduction in underpricing can vary
from $304,654 to $548,377 with the addition of one top
management executive. In a study of firms that made changes
in the final year prior to the IPO,Chen,Hambrick,and Pollock
(2008) found that firms spent between $120,000 to $385,000
per executive, depending on the proximity to offer date and
prestige of the individual. Combining the findings of the two
studies, firms will be more than compensated for the cost of
new hires through the reduction of underpricing.
While it is clear that issuers would enjoy these reduced
levels of underpricing, we know from other studies that
there is also a partial adjustment phenomenon, whereby the
underwriter only incorporates a small portion of the change
in value of a firm in the final few months before the offer date
(Bradley & Jordan, 2002; Hanley, 1993; Loughran & Ritter,
2004). While we can count in dollars the financial benefits
and costs to the issuer, we can only guess the impact and
entrepreneurial intensity on the entrepreneurial founding
members.Among the 237 sample firms, 131 still had at least
one founder in the company. However, some of these
founders were now chairman, functional department heads,
or CEOs. It was beyond the scope of this research project to
track the number of founders who were “kicked upstairs” to
make room for a new CEO,or “kicked sideways”to a function-
al job, such as head of technology, or “kicked out” entirely as
issuers and underwriters made pre-IPO organizational
changes.
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Table 3. Regressions: Dependent Variable New Directors and Underpricing
New Directors < 6 Underpricing Underpricing Underpricing
Parameter Control Model 1 Control Model 4a Control Model 4b Control Model 4c
(Constant) 1.643**  3.371**  -0.385*   -0.363*   -0.385*   -0.342     -0.385*   -0.354     
(0.714) (1.491) (0.215) (0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.218)
Comp/Telecom 0.075     0.069     0.039     0.043     0.039     0.037     0.039     0.04     
(0.294) (0.296) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Apparel 0.22     0.204     -0.018     -0.019     -0.018     -0.008     -0.018     -0.017     
(0.399) (0.407) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Pharma -0.257     -0.243     -0.101**  -0.105**  -0.101**  -0.11**  -0.101**  -0.103**  
(0.292) (0.297) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Age -0.007     -0.01     0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001     0.000 -0.001     
(0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year 0.018     -0.002     0.000 0.000 0.002     0.000 0.002     0.002     
(0.068) (0.068) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Insider Equity -0.006     -0.006     0.001     0.001     0.001     0.001     0.001     0.001     
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Risk Factors 0.011     0.015     0.006**  0.007**  0.006**  0.007**  0.006**  0.007**  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
VC Backed -0.394*   -0.378     0.04     0.041     0.04     0.04     0.04     0.037     
(0.234) (0.235) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Auditor Prestige -0.512     -0.494     -0.1*   -0.094     -0.1*   -0.093     -0.1*   -0.104*   
(0.411) (0.418) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.061)
Offer Price 0.052**  0.028     0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
(0.026) (0.035) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
IssuerPower 0.646     0.103**  0.101**  0.103**  0.095**  0.103**  0.099**  
(0.393) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
UnderwriterPower -0.48     -0.13**  -0.134**  -0.13**  -0.128**  -0.13**  -0.124**  
(0.316) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
IssuerPowerRatio -1.354     0.202     0.19     0.202     0.172     0.202     0.19     
(1.18) (0.17) (0.169) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.171)
Top Change6 -0.062**  
(0.031)
Total TMT Change -0.035*   
(0.019)
NewDirector6 -0.009     
(0.01)
R2 0.179 0.181 0.264 0.293 0.265 0.290 0.264 0.265
Adj. R2 0.133 0.130 0.218 0.246 0.219 0.242 0.218 0.216
_ R2 0.179 0.001 0.264 0.029 0.265 0.025 0.264 0.001
F Statistic 3.843 0.334 5.789 8.630 5.792 7.341 5.789 0.407
Significance 0.000 0.564 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.524
* p ! .10; ** p ! .05;*** p ! .01; Unstandardized Coefficients shown.
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While the issuers have extracted a benefit from adding
new hires, so has the underwriter.Thus, the second question
still remains: Who is doing the signaling? Unfortunately, the
remainder of the results here are inconclusive vis-à-vis an
association between organizational change and relative
resource power. In some of the regression analyses, relative
power approached significance. So part of the reason these
theories were not empirically supported was for the short-
comings in the research tools and variables identified in the
present study. I believe there is still work to be done in hon-
ing the methods and identifying modifiers. Yet there is also
the possibility that issuers are not being pressured into mak-
ing changes, but are doing so for other reasons.The lack of
significance in the predictors associated with change in audi-
tors could also suggest that issuers in these industries began
operations with national firms. The Big 5 accounting firms
are prevalent in IPO companies, and it may be that the effort
on their part to provide service to smaller technology firms
precluded the need for small firms to upgrade auditors. In
fact, during the period from 1998 to 2001 in these same
industries, only seven firms chose to go public with a firm
that was not one of the Big 5.
The lack of significance in the bargaining predictors for
CEOs and chairmen also suggests alternative explanations. It
was originally theorized that investors would be less confi-
dent of managers with limited operating experience. In prac-
tice, the age or experience of CEOs may not have been as big
a concern to investors as originally thought.One rationale for
the addition of a new chairman or COO would be to bolster
the experience level of young CEOs. However the average
age of new chairmen was 49.3, versus the average age of the
CEO in those companies,which was 47.7. Such a small differ-
ence in age would not warrant making such a change. Similar
findings were noted for the COO, where the average age of
the new hire was 42.5, while the CEO’s average age was 49.5
in those companies. Operating history also did not seem a
concern, as the cumulative amount of the new hires reached
the midpoint with firms that were of the median age of 7
years. Financial reporting may have been more important as
50% of the total number of CFOs hired occurred with firms
5 years or younger.Although some CFOs could be replacing
competent incumbents, it is also possible that some of these
young firms were hiring their first finance manager capable
of performing the accounting function for a public corpora-
tion. In that case the issuer was not dressing up, but arming
itself with the right tools to be successful.
The results surrounding the addition of new directors are
also puzzling. In Certo’s previous study,overall board size was
found to be significantly associated with reduced levels of
underpricing. However, the addition of new directors in this
study had no effect on underpricing. Although many new
directors were hired, young firms may not have been chang-
ing directors as much as staffing the positions in the first
place. To this point, a future retesting of this phenomenon
might include a measure on prestige. Furthermore, many
board positions run for three-year terms, so a larger amount
of turnover might occur in these positions as compared to
the CEO, COO, and CFO. Finally, the sample itself and the
make-up of firms included many with venture capital back-
ing. In such cases,members of the VCs might hold board posi-
tions that they may prefer to vacate after a liquidating event;
new hires in this scenario would not be hired as a result of
influence, but of need.
An analysis of the control variables is also of interest. First,
in the models for new CEOs and COOs,year is significant and
negative, suggesting that as the decade progressed fewer
companies were bringing in these types of executive at the
eleventh hour.This could be a reflection of the learning that
occurred earlier in the decade, that replacing technology
intensive company’s leaders may have had some of the nega-
tive effects described earlier. Another possible explanation
could be a lack of candidates as the sheer number of new
public companies would have taxed the available pool of
appropriate candidates. In the case of a new chairman, the
percent equity held variable reflects the current manage-
ment team’s ability to inhibit the addition of a “new boss,” so
that combined with the increase in risk factors may require
the addition of someone to address investors’ concerns.
Issuer size was also positive and significant in regressions for
new chairmen, implying that larger firms may require a sepa-
ration of board leadership from the executive team to
address investor’s concerns about potential agency conflicts.
Finally, underwriter prestige was negative and significant in
many of the regressions on new hires.This could be an indi-
cation that more prestigious underwriters tend toward
issuers who already have completed their final TMT imple-
mentation.There are ongoing relationships between VCs and
prestigious underwriters. One of the responsibilities of ven-
ture firms is to evaluate the TMTs of the firms in which they
invest, and make appropriate changes as a normal course of
business. That said, venture capital backing was not signifi-
cant in any of the regressions.
Limitations and Future Research
This study has several limitations that should be acknowl-
edged. First, although the industries chosen for the sample
are reflective of the companies that went public in abun-
dance during the 1990s, there is significant weighting toward
technology that limits the generalizability of the findings.
Technology firms in particular have higher levels of uncer-
tainty in valuation,and as such the addition of known individ-
uals may have a more pronounced effect on underpricing
than in other more easily valued industries. Second, an
assumption has been made that organizational changes made
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within six months of the IPO date are after the issuer and
underwriter agree to work together.This may not always be
the case. Actual contract dates are not available to the
researcher so the assumption is reasonable in most but not
all cases.Third, I made the assumption that new hires made
just before the IPO would be made with an eye to upgrade
the organization from the perception of investors. I did not,
however, track prestigious affiliations that could provide an
interesting filter. Fourth, although my argument for under-
writer influence hinges on relative power derived from
resources, I did not pursue key informant observations from
individuals involved with each IPO
Future research should attempt to refine the measures of
relative bargaining power in this setting. Key informant stud-
ies would be helpful to uncover any latent variable not
included here. It would also be of keen interest to track
exactly how many original founders were displaced and
what effect it had on those individuals as well as the entre-
preneurial spirit of the firm. In addition, it would be of great
interest to track the tenure and performance of these late
hires to see if they have a positive or negative long-term
effect on the issuing firm.
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